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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are sitting in a conference room at the beginning of a mediation session. You are either a party to the dispute that is being mediated or
counsel to one of the parties. The mediator is giving his or her opening statement
setting forth the parameters of the process. After providing a variety of information including the ground-rules for the proceeding, the mediator then delivers one
or the other of the following two statements:
Alternative I. Let me now turn to the topic of confidentiality. You
should be aware that under state law, except for a few narrow exceptions,
everything that we discuss here today is confidential. In general, that
means you are not supposed to talk about what we say and do here today
once we conclude the mediation. In particular, the relevant state law
makes all communications at this mediation - both verbal and nonverbal
- that relate to this pending dispute confidential. Our communications are
not subject to disclosure and cannot be used as evidence in any later court
or agency proceeding. These confidentiality rules apply to both you and
me. The governing statute states very explicitly that I have to maintain
* Darryl Royal, the longtime football coaching legend of the University of Texas, is reputed to
have stated in response to a reporter's query about changing strategy, "You dance with the one who
'brung' you." See, e.g., Editorial, Bush Back, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 4, 1998, at A42. (attributing statement to Royal); Texas, Southern Cal Coaches on Hot Seat, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1986, at C4 (similar
attribution).
** Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Charles "Tex" Thornton Professor of Law, Texas
Tech University School of Law; B.S., summa cum laude, Angelo State University, 1979; J.D., with
high honors, The University of Texas School of Law, 1982. Dean Shannon served on the Section
Council of the State Bar of Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Section from 1999-2002 and is the
vice-chair of the South Plains Dispute Resolution Center Advisory Committee. The views set forth in
this Article, however, are entirely those of the author.
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confidentiality with respect to any of the communications here today that
relate to this dispute. Additionally, that same law requires that unless
both sides later agree, all matters covered here today, including the conduct and demeanor of all those who are present, are confidential, and I
cannot disclose them to anyone, including the court. Similarly, if we
break into caucus sessions, as I described earlier in my overview, if you
tell me something in confidence at that time, I am not allowed to disclose
that information to the opposing side without your permission. In general, the only exceptions set out in the law relate to situations in which
some other law might require disclosure - for example, there is another
law that requires the reporting of child or elder abuse or neglect. Moreover, a court will not allow an exception to confidentiality unless it first
holds a non-public and in camera hearing to consider the applicability of
the exception or need for disclosure. You should also be aware that our
state confidentiality statute might not be applicable in the event of some
type of federal criminal investigation.
When our state legislature enacted our first comprehensive alternative
dispute resolution procedure statute some fifteen years ago, the lawmakers intended to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes outside of
court, and to provide a broad cloak of confidentiality for proceedings like
the one you are participating in today. The purpose of requiring confidentiality was to encourage everyone to be candid, and to have the opportunity to be very forthcoming about the strengths and weaknesses of
pending cases without the fear that such candor with regard to offers and
other information might be subject to later attempts at disclosure either in
court or elsewhere. There was a strongly held belief that a broad confidentiality law would better facilitate frank and open discussions and
thereby bring about greater opportunities for understanding and settlement. Accordingly, the matters discussed today should be kept confidential. Unless somehow ordered by a court, you are not going to have to,
nor will you be allowed to, give evidence about the matters discussed in
this session. Indeed, you have a duty to keep today's proceedings confidential.
Our laws relating to confidentiality also apply to any writings or documents created at today's session. Unlike those depositions that you told
me about that were taken earlier in this pending case, you have no doubt
noticed that there is no court reporter present with us today. That is because a record is not normally kept as part of a mediation. In fact, at the
end of the mediation session, I am going to require you to give me all of
your notes. I will then take your notes, along with mine, and destroy
them after the mediation's conclusion. The only documents that will
originate in this session that might ultimately be subject to later disclosure are either a final signed agreement, or a form that we will complete
if no settlement is reached. Obviously, I will use my best efforts to facilitate your reaching a voluntary settlement here today, but if we are unable to reach agreement, I will need to send to the court [if the mediation
has been conducted pursuant to a court order or local rule] a statement
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/10
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that the mediation was conducted today as ordered, that you showed up
as required, and that no settlement was reached.
Do any of you have any questions about the requirements of confidentiality that govern our proceedings today?
Alternative II. Let me now turn to the topics of privilege and confidentiality. Our state law includes provisions that are intended to protect the
confidentiality of mediation communications against attempts at disclosure in later legal proceedings. If there is some later legal proceeding in
which a person attempts to discover or introduce evidence about what we
have addressed today, state law has created certain mediation privileges.
These privileges apply broadly to all types of mediation communications,
including verbal, non-verbal, and written communications. As a general
matter, a privilege operates to allow a person either to refuse to disclose
information or to stop somebody else from disclosing information; it allows for a type of blocking function. That is, if you have a privilege, it
gives you certain powers to block later disclosure. You should be aware,
however, that different people involved in this process have differing
levels of privilege. For example, as a general matter, you two parties
have the ability to refuse to disclose any of our mediation communications here today and block any of the rest of us from so disclosing. I
must caution you, however, that our law considers your attorneys as nonparty participants, and they can only refuse to disclose and prevent others
from disclosing any communications made today by the nonparty participants. For our purposes today, that would apply to the two attorneys
who are present. As the mediator, I can refuse to disclose any mediation
communications, but I can only block others from disclosing my communications. On the other hand, if you don't like these various rules, you
can agree right now in writing, or at any point during the mediation, that
all or part of the mediation is not privileged. In that case, the state's laws
on privileges will not be applicable.
I should also caution you that our state law sets forth a lengthy number of
waivers and exceptions to these blocking privileges that I have just described. Let me first address waivers of the privilege. If both of you parties agree in writing or orally at some later legal proceeding to waive any
of the privileges, you can do so for certain privileges. But, as for my
privilege as a mediator, I would have to agree, too. Similarly, given that
your respective lawyers who are present here today are considered as
nonparty participants, they will have to agree to any waiver of their mediation privileges. In addition, you will waive your privilege if you make
disclosures in some later proceeding that prejudices another person in
that proceeding. In such a case, the other person can talk about what
happened in the mediation as a response to the prior disclosure. And,
obviously, if you are attempting to use these proceedings to plan, attempt
to commit or commit a crime, or to conceal criminal activity, you will
not be able to assert any sort of mediation privilege. Of course, I hope
that will not be the case with today's mediation! In addition, on this
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003
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topic of criminal law, you should also be aware that our state law privileges statute might not be applicable in the event of some type of federal
criminal investigation.
Let me now turn to the principal exceptions to the various mediation
privileges. Our legislature has created a number of these exceptions. For
example, similar to the waiver I just discussed, statements threatening
bodily harm, violence, or other criminality are not covered. Also, if you
ever bring a claim of malpractice against me, you can try to prove your
claim or I can try to disprove your claim with testimony about what we
have to say today. Obviously, I do not believe that you will need to consider any such action because I plan to act professionally throughout our
proceedings. On the topic of malpractice, however, I should also point
out that the statute has certain exceptions related to disclosures of mediation communications if some type of malpractice claim is pursued against
one of the attorneys or parties here today; however, I could not be compelled to disclose anything in such a case. There is also no privilege that
attaches to allegations of child or adult abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation. The law also has exceptions relating to contract defenses to
any settlement agreement we might reach and criminal proceedings, but
before such an exception is invoked, the court will first hear argument relating to the need for such evidence in camera - not in public.
Do you have any questions so far with regard to mediation privileges,
waivers, and exceptions to the privileges? As you can readily appreciate,
our state legislature believes that these matters are very important. I suspect that is why they set out such a detailed array of rules, waivers, and
exceptions. Before we proceed with the mediation, however, I need to
discuss one further matter relating to this general topic. I would be remiss
if I did not address the difference between confidentiality and privilege.
Under our state law, the discussions we have today are not generally confidential. That is, there is no law that precludes you from talking about
what we say today with any other person outside of a later legal proceeding. Thus, you are free to talk about the things learned at mediation with
anybody, including the media. The mediation privilege statute that I just
explained to you relates only to disclosures in later legal proceedings. If
you would like to have a broader degree of confidentiality, you will have
to agree to it. Is this something that you would like to consider? Is it an
issue that you would like to discuss with your attorneys? If so, we can
take a little break at this point before proceeding further. Otherwise, do
you have any questions about confidentiality and later disclosures?
Although the two alternative statements set forth above may well be subject
to charges of exaggeration, they are intended to highlight the stark comparisons
between the parameters and scope of the confidentiality provisions of the Texas

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/10

4

20031

Shannon:
Shannon:with
Dancing
with the
One
That Brung
Us" Us
Dancing
the One
that
"Brung

Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act (Texas ADR Act)' with the disclosure privileges, waivers, and exceptions contained in the Uniform Mediation Act
(UMA). 2 I am very pleased that the Journalof Dispute Resolution has invited me
to participate in this important symposium on the UMA. I must confess, however,
that because my views are inconsistent with those of the other participants, I feel
somewhat like the proverbial skunk in the parlor. Nonetheless, I am glad to have
the opportunity to discuss some of the dissenting viewpoints regarding the UMA.
I readily acknowledge that the UMA is a bold and noble project, and it is certainly the result of substantial effort and compromise. Indeed, I largely concur
with the sentiment of Philip Harter that "[tihe UMA is the product of heroic effort
that brought together many interests and perspectives to thrash out a workable
framework for mediation."3 That being said, however, much of the Texas mediation community, of which I am a part, has largely opposed enactment of the
UMA's framework for our state. As I have written previously, the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Section of the State Bar of Texas (Texas ADR Section) has
publicly stated its opposition. 4 Similarly, the Association of Attorney-Mediators
(AAM) and the Texas Association of Mediators have registered their strong opposition. 5 The primary concerns of these organizations relate to two principal areas:
(1) the UMA drafters' approach to confidentiality in comparison to the longestablished legislative approach set forth in the Texas ADR Act, and (2) the relative complexity of the UMA's provisions. In this essay I will first address these
two major areas of opposition. Then, I will turn to several ancillary concerns,
followed by a brief discussion of certain other entities' objections. I then encourage the reader to consider the other contributors' responses to my viewpoints.
II. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO CONFIDENTIALITY
The Texas Legislature enacted the Texas ADR Act in 1987. Thus, Texas mediators and courts have over fifteen years of experience in conducting or ordering
mediations and other non-binding processes under this statutory scheme. One of
the cornerstones of the enactment was the statute's broad confidentiality protection.6 These confidentiality protections are set forth in two sections of the act.

1. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 154.001 - .073 (West 2003) [hereinafter "Texas ADR
Act"].
2. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Mediation Act (2001)
[hereinafter "UMA"].
3. Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: An Essential Frameworkfor Self-Determination,
22 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 251, 252 (Spring 2002).
4. Wayne I. Fagan & Brian D. Shannon, A Potential Threat to Texas ADR, 65 Tex. B. J. 27 (2002).
Mr. Fagan is the immediate past chair of the Section.
5. Letter from the President, AAM Newsletter (Assoc. of Attorney-Mediators, Dallas, TX) 1, 2
(Sept. 2002). <http://www.attomey-mediators.org/news2002O9.pdf> (accessed March 13, 2003)
(AAM is a national association with its headquarters in Dallas); see also Minutes of Texas Association of Mediators Board of Directors Meeting 2 (May 18, 2002) (on file with the Journal of Dispute
Resolution) (reflecting unanimous board vote to oppose the adoption of the UMA in Texas).
6. Dean Ed Sherman has described the Texas ADR Act's confidentiality section as "perhaps the
broadest ADR confidentiality provision in the country." Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR
Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising From the Texas Experience, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 541, 542 (1997).
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Section 154.073 delineates the primary confidentiality provisions of the law.
Apart from certain narrow exceptions set forth in the act, the statute provides that:

a communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal
dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as
evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceed8
ing.
In addition,
[alny record made at an alternative dispute resolution procedure is confidential, and the participants or the third party facilitating the procedure
may not be required to testify in any proceedings relating to or arising
out of the matter in dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure
of confidential information or data relating to or arising out of the matter
in dispute. 9
Accordingly, the Texas ADR Act sets out abroad confidentiality rule applicable
to Texas mediations and other non-binding procedures, and includes a form of
evidentiary privilege that applies to both participants and neutrals.

7. Section 154.073 provides the following:
(a) Except as provided by Subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), a communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence against the participant in any
judicial or administrative proceeding.
(b) Any record made at an alternative dispute resolution procedure is confidential, and the participants or the third party facilitating the procedure may not be required to testify in any proceedings relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute or be subject to process requiring disclosure of confidential information or data relating to or arising out of the matter in dispute.
(c) An oral communication or written material used in or made a part of an alternative dispute
resolution procedure is admissible or discoverable if it is admissible or discoverable independent
of the procedure.
(d) A final written agreement to which a governmental body, as defined by Section 552.003,
Government Code, is a signatory that is reached as a result of a dispute resolution procedure conducted under this chapter is subject to or excepted from required disclosure in accordance with
Chapter 552, Government Code.
(e) If this section conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of communications, records, or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to the court having jurisdiction
of the proceedings to determine, in camera, whether the facts, circumstances, and context of the
communications or materials sought to be disclosed warrant a protective order of the court or
whether the communications or material are subject to disclosure.
(f) This section does not affect the duty to report abuse or neglect under Subchapter B, Chapter
261, Family Code, and abuse, exploitation, or neglect under Subchapter C, Chapter 48, Human
Resources Code.
(g) This section applies to a victim-offender mediation by the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice as described in Article 56.13, Code of Criminal Procedure.
Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, § 154.073.
8. Id. § 154.073(a).
9. Id. § 154.073(b).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/10
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Moreover, supplemental to these main confidentiality provisions, Section
154.053 of the Texas ADR Act explicitly places a duty on the mediator to "at all
times maintain confidentiality with respect to communications relating to the subject matter of the dispute."' 10 Additionally, even if these other provisions are not
sufficiently clear, Section 154.053 of the Texas ADR Act provides further that
"[ulnless the parties agree otherwise, all matters, including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel during the settlement process, are confi-!
dential and may never be disclosed to anyone, including the appointing court.""
Hence, taken together these various provisions place limits on future testimony in
later adjudications and require confidentiality outside of other legal proceedings.
In contrast to the Texas ADR Act, the UMA approaches confidentiality much
differently. As stated by the immediate past chair of the ADR Section Council of
the State Bar of Texas, "Whereas the Texas ADR ...Act's confidentiality provisions start with the general proposition that all ADR communications are confidential, save for several exceptions, the UMA focuses instead on privileges from
discovery and admissibility in later proceedings."' 2 Indeed, the UMA's drafters
declined to include a general requirement of confidentiality. Apparently in response to criticism for this omission, however, the drafters included some coverage of general confidentiality in the final version of the UMA. Section 8 of the
UMA provides, "Unless subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetto the
ings act and open records act], mediation communications are confidential
13
extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law or rule of this State.,
The UMA's drafters apparently "were unable to agree on a confidentiality requirement for mediation that would reach beyond the protection of a privilege to

10. Id. § 154.053(b).
11. Id. § 154.053(c). Section 154.053 primarily relates to the mediator's duties, but there is some
degree of overlap with § 154.073. The full text of § 154.053 is as follows:
(a) A person appointed to facilitate an alternative dispute resolution procedure under this subchapter shall encourage and assist the parties in reaching a settlement of their dispute but may not
compel or coerce the parties to enter into a settlement agreement.
(b) Unless expressly authorized by the disclosing party, the impartial third party may not disclose to either party information given in confidence by the other and shall at all times maintain
confidentiality with respect to communications relating to the subject matter of the dispute.
(c) Unless the parties agree otherwise, all matters, including the conduct and demeanor of the
parties and their counsel during the settlement process, are confidential and may never be disclosed to anyone, including the appointing court.
(d) Each participant, including the impartial third party, to an alternative dispute resolution procedure is subject to the requirements of Subchapter B, Chapter 261, Family Code, and Subchapter C, Chapter 48, Human Resources Code.
Id. § 154.053. It is also interesting to note that the Texas Legislature re-embraced the Texas ADR Act
as recently as 1997 when it enacted the Governmental Dispute Resolution Act, Tex. Govt. Code Ann.
§§ 2009.001 - .055 (West 2003). Except for minor distinctions, section 2009.054 incorporates by
reference both section 154.053 and 154.073 of the Texas ADR Act. Id. § 2009.054(a)-(d).
12. Letter from Wayne Fagan, Chair, State Bar of Texas ADR Section Council, to Texas members
of the ABA House of Delegates, ABA House of Delegates Vote on the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) 1
(Nov. 14, 2001) <http://www.texasadr.org/umaletter.pdf> (accessed March 13, 2003). Mr. Fagan also
stated, "The UMA proposal has headed in the wrong direction by not beginning with a wide umbrella
of confidentiality protection followed by appropriate exceptions." Id. I assisted Mr. Fagan in the
preparation of this letter.
13. UMA, supra n. 2, § 8.
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govern disclosures in settings other than legal proceedings."' 14 Accordingly, the
drafters punted on the issue and left the decision-making up to possible agreement
by the parties or other state enactments. The drafters observed that they wanted to
leave "the disclosure of mediation communications outside of proceedings to the
good judgment of the parties to determine in light of the unique characteristics and
circumstances of their dispute."' 15 Also, and perhaps as a nod to states such as
Texas that had raised concerns about the lack of general confidentiality, the drafters structured Section 8 to allow states to retain or adopt general confidentiality
provisions. Indeed, in the Official Comments to Section 8, the drafters cited to one
of the Texas ADR Act's confidentiality provisions in expressing the intent of not
wanting to "interfere with local customs, practices, interpretations, or understandings regarding
the disclosure of mediation communications outside of proceed16
ings.'

One irony of the UMA's approach to general confidentiality of mediation
communications in Section 8 is that the drafters have intentionally included a
provision that is directly inconsistent with their overall push for uniformity. The
goal of uniformity is worthwhile. On the other hand, why should a state such as
Texas with its well-developed ADR statute shelve that statute for the UMA when
there is apparently going to be no uniformity on a central issue of consideration?
The drafters have opined that "uniformity is not necessary or even appropriate
with regard to the disclosure of mediation communications outside of proceedings."' 17 This statement appears incongruous when contrasted with one of the
drafters' essential premises - that "[c]andor during mediation is encouraged by
maintaining the parties' and mediators' expectations regarding confidentiality of
mediation communications."' 18 How is such candor enhanced if the parties are
advised, as discussed in Alternative II above, that the matters to be discussed at
the mediation might not be subject to later use as evidence in future adjudicatory
proceedings, but may otherwise be freely disclosed? How is uniformity to be
achieved if this important issue is left up to the parties or individual states?
Separate from the issue of non-uniformity, the drafters' approach in Section 8
that leaves confidentiality up to the agreement of the parties has dubious merit. Of
course, in some situations parties may be willing to engage in a general confiden14. Ellen E. Deason, Uniform Mediation Act - Law Ensures Confidentiality, Neutrality of Process,
Dis. Res. Mag. 7, 9 (Summer 2002).
15. UMA, supra n. 2, § 8, cmt. c.
16. See id. § 8, cmt. b (suggesting that the UMA is not intended to preempt "current court rules or
statutes that may be understood or interpreted to impose a duty of confidentiality outside of proceedings").
17. Id. § 8, cmt. a.
18. UMA, supra n. 2, at Prefatory Note § 1. One of the reasons the drafters have offered for not
including a broad confidentiality provision is centered on "the risk of civil liability that might accompany an affirmative statutory duty prohibiting such disclosures." UMA, supra n. 2, § 8, cmt. a. In
certain situations, however, the prospect of civil liability may well be appropriate. Consider, for example, a situation in which a party to a mediation discloses something controversial or negative about
herself. The other party then discloses the information to the disclosing party's employer, spouse, or
the media. The information is then used in a damaging manner. If the disclosure was in violation of a
statutory duty, there might, and perhaps should, be the consideration of civil liability. Under the UMA
approach, however, such disclosures are freely permitted. For a further discussion of problems and
concerns regarding disclosures outside of later legal proceedings, see Brian D. Shannon, Confidentiality of Texas Mediations: Ruminations on Some Thorny Problems, 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 77, 79-86

(2000).
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tiality agreement prior to the commencement of a mediation. In addition, certain
dispute resolution organizations might require that the parties agree to abide by
rules of that organization that call for broad confidentiality. However, the opportunity to secure a pre-mediation agreement will not always be readily achievable.
While a dispute is pending and prior to the outset of a mediation, the parties may
be well-entrenched in their positions and unwilling to agree to much of anything particularly with respect to a subject as important as confidentiality that might
have far-reaching implications. Similarly, in the case of a court-ordered mediation, the parties may well be entering into the mediation process in a reluctant
fashion and not have any strong interest in reaching an agreement at the outset on
the issue of confidentiality or anything else. Moreover, as illustrated in Alternative IHabove, once a mediator has attempted to explain the broad array of privileges, waivers, and exceptions that are included in the UMA, it may prove difficult to then explain the distinctions between privileges and confidentiality and
whether the parties - particularly unrepresented parties - would also want to enter
into a confidentiality agreement.
Of course, no statute is perfect, and the Texas ADR Act's confidentiality provisions are far from perfect. As I have detailed in another forum, there are some
gaps in the Texas ADR Act's coverage with regard to confidentiality.' For example, the Texas ADR Act does not include any exception to confidentiality to allow
parties to use mediation communications as part of proving a traditional contract
defense.2° In the event of the potential for a miscarriage of justice, however, a
court may not be deterred by the lack of a statutory exception. For example, in an
unreported case, Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc.,2t a party who participated in a mediation asserted that a settlement agreement reached at the mediation was void because he had signed it under duress.22 The party asserted that despite fatigue and
chest pains, the mediator had announced that he could not leave the session "until
a settlement was reached"; thus, he signed the agreement.23 Although the opposing
party asserted that the confidentiality provisions of the Texas ADR Act precluded
introduction of such statements at the subsequent court challenge, the court conclusorily determined that a party could not "sue for specific performance of the
mediation agreement" and simultaneously "argue that the mediation communications are confidential as to ...[the other party's] duress defense., 24 Thus, despite
the lack of an exception to the state's confidentiality statutes, the court's sense of
justice apparently led it to create an ad hoc exception. 2 As I have argued else-

19. Id.
20. For a detailed discussion of this gap under the Texas ADR Act, see id. at 86-89 (discussing the
need for a legislative exception to confidentiality for traditional contract defenses).
21. 1996 WL 447954 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 8, 1996, writ denied).
22. Id. at *1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For a similar judicially created exception to a broad confidentiality statute, consider Olam v.
Congress Mortg. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118-19 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (requiring the testimony of the
mediator in a subsequent challenge to an agreement reached at mediation based on the traditional
contract defenses of alleged undue influence and lack of capacity).
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where, "Because of the uncertainty associated with judge-made
26 decision-making
in this regard, ... a legislative solution would be far superior.,
In this regard, the Texas Legislature should consider adopting an exception to
confidentiality for traditional contract defenses. One possibility is to consider an
approach that is comparable to UMA section 6(b)(2), which allows testimony,
after an in camera hearing process, "to prove a claim to rescind or reform or a
defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation., 27 Ironically,
however, the UMA disallows the mediator from being compelled to give testimony relating to such a contract defense. 2 8 A court's sense of justice may cause it
to chafe under such a limitation. The UMA drafters wanted to avoid parties' "frequent attempts to use the mediator as a tie-breaking witness., 29 An alternative
would be to advocate for the aggressive use of sanctions for frivolous assertions of
defenses. Of course, the Texas Legislature need not adopt the UMA to cherry-pick
worthwhile exceptions. By way of comparison, Louisiana's ADR statute includes
a broad confidentiality statute with limited exceptions and contains a specific
exception to determine the "meaning or enforceability" of a mediated agreement if
"necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice., 30 Like the UMA, however, the
Louisiana provision excludes the mediator from being compelled to testify in such
situations.
In addition to the Randle court's allowance of mediation communications to
support a duress defense, other Texas courts have allowed the later introduction of
mediation communications despite the broad confidentiality provisions set forth in
the law. For example, in Hur v. City of Mesquite,32 an injured party in an automobile-pedestrian accident sued the city for negligence. At a later mediation, although the representative of the city declared at the outset of the session that he
had authority to settle, once an oral agreement was reached to resolve the dispute,
the city representative "announced that the verbal agreement would have to be
approved by the Mesquite City Council or there [would be] no agreement., 33 After
the city did not pay the agreed sum, the opposing side pursued actions for breach
of the oral settlement agreement and breach of the implied warranty of authority
of the agent to settle the case.34 The Texas Court of Appeals questionably allowed
testimony on both theories even though the supporting contentions were largely
26. See Shannon, supra n. 18, at 89 (also suggesting that a court should be "ready and willing to
sanction frivolous assertions of contract defenses" to avoid abuse of such an exception). Not all courts
have been as willing as the Randle court to ignore the confidentiality provisions of the Texas ADR
Act. See e.g. Vick v. Waits, 2002 WL 1163842 at *3 (Tex. App. - Dallas June 4, 2002, pet. denied)
(disallowing introduction of mediation communications that were intended to demonstrate fraud in the
inducement of a mediation agreement); In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 452-53 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2000, no pet.) (reversing trial court's allowance of inquiries about mediation communications relating to the negotiations and settlement authority).
27. UMA, supra n. 2, § 6(b)(2).
28. Id. § 6(c) (stating that a "mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in subsection ...(b)(2)"). Of course, this approach is contrary to the ad hoc
confidentiality exception reached by the court in Olam, in which the court required the mediator's
testimony after an in camera hearing. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
29. Id. § 6, cmt. 12.
30. La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4112(B)(l)(c) (West Supp. 2002).
31. Id. § (B)(2).
32. 893 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tex. App. - Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
33. Id. at 232.
34. Id. at 232-33.
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based on mediation communications. 35 Nonetheless, it is not surprising that a
court's sense of justice would cause it not "to allow a representative of a public
entity to make false representations about her authority at the mediation, only to
then wrap herself in the mantle of confidentiality when her approach is [later]
challenged., 36 Other courts have also discarded confidentiality when faced with
situations involving departures from a sense of fairness. In Avery v. Bank of
America, NA., 7 the court allowed a foray into mediation communications as part
of a party's proof of an independent tort claim relating to a bank's alleged failure
to disclose - at the mediation - material facts relating to the rights of an estate's
beneficiaries. Consider also the unreported decision in Guevara v. Sahoo,38 in
which the court failed to find an abuse of discretion in a case in which the trial
a lawyer for certain communications made at a court-ordered
court had sanctioned
39
mediation.
Given such decisions, it appears that some courts have effectively engrafted
an ad hoc "manifest injustice" exception to broad confidentiality provisions when
one is lacking. It is worthy of note that the drafters of the UMA considered the
adoption of an exception for "manifest injustice," but discarded the idea during
the evolution of the proposal. 40 By way of contrast, the federal Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act includes a narrowly tailored exception for situations in
which a court determines that the disclosure is necessary to prevent a "manifest
injustice. ' 41 If the Texas Legislature is troubled by some of these recent court
decisions, an approach of adopting a few narrow amendments to the existing law
would be superior to eliminating the current Texas ADR Act and its fifteen years
of application and experience.
Although it is my firm conviction that the Texas Legislature should reject any
entreaties to replace the Texas ADR Act with the UMA, there are certain aspects
of the UMA that merit consideration as potentially valuable amendments to the
existing Texas statute. Indeed, like the exception for contract defenses, a few of
the UMA's numerous exceptions to its complex privileges structure should merit
serious contemplation as possible additional exceptions to the Texas confidentiality provisions. For example, the UMA drafters have added exceptions by which
mediation communications can be used to prove or disprove malpractice claims
35. Id. at 232-34. For a full discussion and critique of Hur, see Shannon, supra n. 18, at 90-94.
36. Shannon, supra n. 18, at 93.
37. 72 S.W.3d 779, 803 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2002, pet. denied).
38. 2001 WL 700517 at *1 (Tex. App. - Dallas June 22, 2001, no pet.).
39. Other jurisdictions have seen similar decisions. For example, the court in Rinaker v. Superior
Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470-71 (Cal. App. 1998), determined that a juvenile's constitutional right
to confrontation in a delinquency proceeding required a mediator to testify despite statutory confidentiality protections. In F.D.I.C. v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 737-38 (N.D. Tex. 1999), the court ignored a local rule on mediation confidentiality to allow testimony that federal agency officials who
participated in a mediation had made threats of criminal prosecution if a pending civil case was not
settled. Similarly, in Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (S.D. Tex. 1998), a federal judge tossed
aside a local rule on mediation confidentiality when a party to a mediation later alleged "that the mediator had 'forced' her and her husband into settling the case and had also misled them." For additional
discussion of Allen, see Shannon, supra n. 18, at 89.
40. For a detailed and thoughtful discussion of the UMA drafters' shifting positions on the inclusion
of an exception for "manifest injustice," see Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation Act: To the
Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 9, 54-63 (Fall 2001).
41. 5 U.S.C. §§ 574(a)(4)(A). (b)(5)(A) (1996).
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against the mediator, party, or party's attorney. 42 As for the exception for malpractice suits against mediators, the drafters included the exception "to promote accountability of mediators by allowing for grievances to be brought against mediators, and as a matter of fundamental fairness, to permit the mediator to defend
against such a claim. '43 The Texas Legislature might give consideration to adding
such an exception to the Texas ADR Act for the same reasons stated by the
UMA's drafters. Given, however, the potential dangers of such an exception in
opening the door to potential frivolous actions, checks and balances such as in
camera hearings and the possibility of imposing sanctions should also be included.
A few other UMA sections are worthy of positive mention as well. For example, the UMA broadly defines "mediation communication" to include oral, written, or nonverbal statements that occur either during the course of a mediation
session, or which have been "made for purposes of considering, conducting, participating in, initiating, continuing, reconvening a mediation, or retaining a mediator." 44 Accordingly, the UMA extends its privileges provisions to a party's first
contact with a prospective mediator and to other communications that are not
directly a part of the mediation session(s). Indeed, the Official Comments reflect
that the provision is intended to make "clear that conversations to initiate mediation and other non-session communications that are related to a mediation are
considered 'mediation communications.' 45 The Texas ADR Act is silent on
whether the statute's confidentiality provisions have application to discussions
relating to the initiation of mediation. Section 154.073 of the Texas ADR Act
makes confidential any "communication relating to the subject matter of any civil
or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure, '' 6 but does not define the beginning point of the ADR procedure. In addition, although Section 154.053 of the Texas ADR Act places duties of nondisclosure on the impartial third party, those would appear logically to apply only
once there has been a selection or appointment of the impartial third party. 47 Thus,
unless covered by a court's local rule or order, 48 it is uncertain whether the broad
confidentiality provisions of the Texas ADR Act extend to pre-session communications. On this point I concur with the UMA's drafters who observed that "candor during these initial conversations is critical to insuring a thoughtful agreement
42. UMA supra n. 2, §§ 6(a)(5)-(6). Another section of the proposal, however, provides that "a
mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication" that relates to
malpractice claims against persons other than the mediator. Id. § 6(c). The Official Comments reveal
that this latter exception relating to the mediator's not having to provide evidence in such an action
was motivated by concern for "the potential adverse impact on a mediator's appearance of impartiality." Id. § 6, cmt. 7.
43. Id. § 6, cmt. 6.
44. UMA, supra n. 2, § 2(2).
45. Id. § 2, cmt. 2.
46. Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, § 154.073(a).
47. See id. § 154.053(b) (requiring the impartial third party to maintain confidentiality "at all
times"). Apparently, Texas is not alone in not covering pre-session communications. As observed in
the Official Comments to the UMA, "[miost statutes are silent on the question of whether they cover
conversations to initiate mediation." UMA, supra n. 2, § 2, cmt. 2.
48. Consider, for example, a local rule in Lubbock County, Texas, by which the courts have interpreted the state's confidentiality statute as applying from "a party's first contact" with the local dispute
resolution center. Policy Statement by Presiding Judge Cecil Puryear, Lubbock County, Texas I
(April 12, 1991) (copy on file with Journal of Dispute Resolution).
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to mediate. 4 9 For example, consider communications with a mediator or a mediation organization prior to the actual mediation session(s) in which matters are
discussed such as the parties' prior relationship or their ability to be in a room
together. Those matters should remain confidential.
In addition, this lack of coverage or lack of clarity in the Texas ADR Act became further apparent in In re Learjet, Inc.50 with regard to another form of premediation communication. In that case Learjet videotaped witness statements of
three employees that were edited, then played for the parties in a mediation.5'
After the mediation failed, the opposing side sought production through the discovery process of both the edited videotapes that had been shown at the mediation
and the "unedited core videotapes. 52 The trial court ordered production, and the
appellate court refused to issue a writ of mandamus. 53 Although the court acknowledged that it was "clear the videotapes were prepared for mediation," the
court determined that the Texas ADR Act did not bar discovery. 54 The court recognized that Section 154.073(a) of that act makes communications "made by a
participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure" confidential. 55 Nonetheless, the court relied on Section 154.073(c)'s proviso that "[a]n oral communication or written material used in or made a part of an alternative dispute resolution
procedure is admissible or discoverable if it is admissible or discoverable independent of the procedure., 56 Given the court's view that the videotapes had been
created prior to the mediation session and were not covered by the attorney-client
privilege, the court held that
the tapes were not covered by the Texas ADR Act's
57
confidentiality provisions.
The Learjet decision points out the problem with the lack of a statutory provision to assure that an ADR statute's confidentiality provisions will protect relevant communications made prior to the actual mediation sessions. The practical
effect of Learjet will be to deter parties from preparing videotaped, or even written, submissions or other communications intended to be delivered to the mediator
in advance of a mediation session or to be used at the mediation. The irony of
Learjet is that had the three individuals actually provided "testimony" at the mediation session, rather than having appeared by means of videotape, there would
have been no question regarding the lack of admissibility of anything to do with
their communications. Accordingly, the UMA's approach of defining "mediation
communications" to cover relevant statements made from the party's first contact
is a better approach. The Learjet videotapes were clearly "made for purposes of ...
participating in ...a mediation...58 Indeed, the UMA's drafters, although not
addressing this precise situation, intended that this definition include such things
as mediation "briefs," reports, and memoranda explaining a party's position that

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

UMA, supra n. 2, § 2, cmt. 2.
59 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. at 844, 847.
Id. at 845.
Id. (citing Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, § 154.073(a)).
59 S.W.3d at 845 (quoting Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, § 154.073(c)).
Id. at 845-47.
UMA, supra n. 2,§ 2(2).
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are prepared in advance of mediation and provided to the mediator. 59 Accordingly,
I support amending the Texas ADR Act to incorporate the UMA's approach to
defining when mediation communications commence, at least as to matters prepared solely for use in a later mediation.
I also favor a portion of Section 7 of the UMA relating to limitations on a
mediator's report to court or agency. Subsections 7(a) and (b)(1) place a strict
limitation on the information that a mediator may disclose to the governing tribunal, which will often be the referring court or agency. 60 Subsection (b)(1) limits
disclosure in such a report to "whether the mediation occurred or has terminated,
'
whether a settlement was reached, and attendance."61
This aspect of the UMA
would be worth considering as a possible amendment to the Texas ADR Act. If a
court has ordered parties to participate in a mediation, the "court is certainly entitled to know whether the parties and their attorneys appeared as ordered for the
ADR proceeding." 62 Having a provision that limits reports to such basic factual
information also removes the temptation for the court to probe into what occurred
during the mediation or to explore the nature of the parties' participation. For
example, the drafters have declared that these "provisions would not permit a
mediator to communicate, for example, on whether a particular party engaged in
"good faith" negotiation, or to state whether a party had been "the problem" in
reaching a settlement." 63 Thus, a clear delineation of the limitations on mediators'
reports as contained in portions of UMA Section 7 would be worthy of possible
amendment to the Texas ADR Act.
However, one aspect of Section 7 of the UMA is quite disturbing. In subsection 7(b)(2), the UMA allows the mediator to make a report to the appointing
court with regard to any of the many mediation privilege exceptions that are included in Section 6 of the UMA. 64 This aspect of the UMA is unclear with regard
to whether such a report would be ordered by a court only after a party's invocation of one of the exceptions to privilege in some later adjudicatory proceeding.
Instead, given the structure of Section 7(b), it appears that a court could generally
require a mediator to detail all possible Section 6 exceptions to privilege as a matter of course. For example, the court's order could require the appointed mediator
to provide the court with a report following the conclusion of the mediation that
(1) states "whether the mediation occurred or ... terminated, whether a settlement

59. Id. § 2, cmt. 2.
60. Id. §§ 7(a), (b)(1).
61. Id. § 7(b)(l). Section 7 also allows a mediator to report to the tribunal mediation communications "evidencing abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation of an individual to a public agency
responsible for protecting individuals against such mistreatment." Id. § 7(b)(3). This subsection is
generally consistent with the requirements under the Texas ADR Act to report child abuse and neglect,
and the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the elderly or persons with disabilities. Texas ADR Act,
supra n. 1, §§ 154.053(d), 154.073(f).
62. Alan S. Rau et el., Rau, Sherman & Shannon's Texas ADR & Arbitration Statutes and Commentary (2000) (although I was a co-author of this publication, Dean Ed Sherman was the principal author
of the quoted section). See also Sherman, supra n. 6, at 552 (discussing how such matters can be best
communicated to the appointing court).
63. UMA, supra n. 2, § 7, cmt. 1. The Texas courts have generally proscribed any duty to mediate
in "good faith." See Shannon, supra n. 18, at 105-09 (discussing Texas cases limiting the disclosure of
mediation communications regarding whether a party participated in good faith).
64. UMA, supra n. 2, §§ 6, 7(b)(2).
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was reached, and [identifies the] attendance;" 65 and (2) delineates all mediation
communications that in the judgment of the mediator would be excepted from
privilege "under Section 6., 6 Although the structure of Section 7 would allow for
this possibility, such an approach would likely chill frank and candid mediation
communications. Although the drafters may have contemplated that this subsection would allow a mediator to create a report only after an exception to privilege
was invoked in a later adjudication, this aspect of the provision is unclear.

III. A PROBLEM OF COMPLEXITY
As the contemplated opening statement identified as Alternative 2 is intended
to reflect, the structure of the proposed UMA is very complex. Instead of providing a broad statement of confidentiality followed by narrow exceptions, the UMA
attempts to safeguard confidentiality through a complex, numerous, and dizzying
array of privileges, waivers, and exceptions. These provisions are set out in UMA
Sections 4-6,67 and represent the "meat" of the proposed statute. UMA Section

65. Id. § 7(b)(1).
66. See id. § 7(b)(2) (allowing a mediator, if required, to disclose "a mediation communication as
permitted under Section 6").
67. UMA, supra n. 2, §§ 4-6. These sections provide the following:
SECTION 4. PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE; ADMISSIBILITY; DISCOVERY.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 6, a mediation communication is privileged as provided in subsection (b) and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding
unless waived or precluded as provided by Section 5.
(b) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:
(1) A mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication.
(2) A mediator may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may prevent any
other person from disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator.
(3) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing, a mediation communication of the nonparty participant.
(c) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become
inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its disclosure or use in a mediation.
SECTION 5. WAIVER AND PRECLUSION OF PRIVILEGE.
(a) A privilege under Section 4 may be waived in a record or orally during a proceeding if it is
expressly waived by all parties to the mediation and:
(1) in the case of the privilege of a mediator, it is expressly waived by the mediator; and
(2) in the case of the privilege of a nonparty participant, it is expressly waived by the nonparty participant.
(b) A person that discloses or makes a representation about a mediation communication which
prejudices another person in a proceeding is precluded from asserting a privilege under Section 4,
but only to the extent necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the representation or disclosure.
(c) A person that intentionally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or
to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity is precluded from asserting a privilege
under Section 4.
SECTION 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE.
(a) There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement;
(2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to open records act] or made
during a session of a mediation which is open, or is required by law to be open, to the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of violence;
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4(a) begins these linked provisions by stating, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
Section 6, a mediation communication is privileged as provided in subsection (b)
and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding unless
waived or precluded as provided by Section 5. ,,68 Thus, Section 4 commences
with the premise that mediation communications will be privileged from disclosure in later legal proceedings unless there is an exception to privilege under
UMA Section 6 or a waiver or a preclusion of privilege under Section 5. However, the language and structure are extremely convoluted and confusing. One
short subsection refers the reader to a privilege structure set out in another subsection and lengthy lists of exceptions, waivers, and preclusions in two additional
major sections of the proposal. Then, to add to the potential for confusion, Section
4 thereafter provides three differing levels of privilege to a mediation participant
depending on whether the person is a party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant. 69 Although the drafters assert that the differentiated tiers of privilege are
intended to bring "clarity" to the law, 70 I predict that the distinctions will prove to
be difficult for (1) mediators to understand and explain to participants, (2) participants to comprehend and appreciate, and (3) courts to readily comprehend and
apply. In Alternative 2 1 have endeavored to delineate a mediator's possible attempt at explaining these various tiers, privileges, exceptions, waivers, and preclusions to the participants at a mediation. Although the approach is exaggerated, I
contend that it is not far off the mark in terms of the level of complexity that must
be learned and explained. The complex and highly legalistic nature of the statute
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing
crime or ongoing criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered to prove or disprove a
claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediation
party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on conduct occurring during a
mediation; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation in a
proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency is a party, unless the
[Alternative A: [State to insert, for example, child or adult protection] case is referred
by a court to mediation and a public agency participates.]
[Alternative B: public agency participates in the [State to insert, for example, child or
adult protection] mediation].
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has
shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or offered in:
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim to rescind
or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication referred to in subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2).
(d) If a mediation communication is not privileged under subsection (a) or (b), only the portion
of the communication necessary for the application of the exception from nondisclosure may be
admitted. Admission of evidence under subsection (a) or (b) does not render the evidence, or any
other mediation communication, discoverable or admissible for any other purpose.
68. Id. § 4(a).
69. Id. § 4(b)(l)-(3).
70. Id. § 4, cmt. 4(a)(1).
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may result in effectively eliminating non-attorney mediators and limit the likelihood of parties' participation in mediation absent legal representation by welltrained mediation advocate attorneys.
The three tiers of privilege also will generate confusion with respect to the
differing levels of privilege afforded to a party versus that party's attorney. The
UMA defines a "mediation party" as a "person that participates in a mediation and
whose agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute." 71 Although one would normally expect a party's counsel to be an agent of the party at a mediation session as
in other forms of legal representation, this definition appears to be too narrow to
include the party's lawyer. Although Section 10 of the UMA specifically allows
an attorney to "accompany the party to and participate in a mediation,, 72 the drafters' Official Comments state that "counsel for a mediation party would not be a
mediation party. 73 Accordingly, the UMA treats the party's attorney as a "nonparty participant" at the mediation. This is both significant and potentially confusing in that Section 4 affords a party a much broader privilege that it confers on
a "nonparty participant." The nonparty participant may only refuse to disclose,
and prevent others from disclosing, that person's mediation communications,
while the party may generally refuse to disclose and block others from disclosing
all mediation communications. 74 Thus, the attorney for the party enjoys a far narrower privilege than does the person the attorney has represented. This dichotomy
is potentially troublesome both because of the quizzical concerns it may raise
when disclosed either by the attorney or the mediator (as I endeavored to demonstrate in Alternative 2 above), and its susceptibility to mischief in later legal proceedings.75
Other provisions of the UMA also have the potential to cause confusion. Section 3(c) of the UMA provides that the statute's large array of privileges do not
apply "[i]f the parties agree in advance in a signed record, or a record of proceeding reflects agreement by the parties, that all or part of a mediation is not privileged., 76 The drafters included this opt-out provision to further the proposal's
"policy of party self-determination. 77 Although the ability to opt out might be
valuable in certain classes of public policy disputes, it could well cause more con"

71. Id. § 2(5).
72. Id. § 10.
73. Id. § 2, cmt. 5.
74. Id. § 4(b)(1), (3).
75. Although the drafters appear to have recognized that their proposal creates differing privileges
between parties and their attorneys, the drafters do not appear to have discussed a rationale for the
dichotomy. In the Official Comments, the drafters opine that "[iln
the event that an attorney is deemed
to be a nonparty participant, that attorney would be constricted in exercising that right by ethical provisions requiring the attorney to act in ways that are consistent with the interests of the client." Id. § 2,
cmt. 4. This suggests that although the drafters quite properly are of the view that an attorney may be
restricted in asserting a privilege that counters the interest of a client, the drafters have not commented
on the gap that could be exploited in that the attorney's privilege is narrower than that enjoyed by the
client. Moreover, it is intriguing to note that the drafters in this comment used the phrase, "[i]n the
event that an attorney is deemed to be a nonparty participant," while in the very next comment the
drafters flatly state that "counsel for a mediation party would not be a mediation party." Compareid. §
2, cmt. 4, with id. § 2, cmt. 5. Why have the drafters hedged here? If the attorney is not a party to the
mediation, and given that the UMA allows the attorney to attend, then that attorney must be a "nonparty participant."
76. Id. § 3(c).
77. Id. § 3, cmt. 7.
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fusion than is worthwhile in other forms of mediation. First, the provision does
not require the parties to the dispute to include, or even to inform, the mediator
about the opt-out agreement. The failure to so inform the mediator will result in
the mediator's privileges to still be applicable given that the statute's privileges
provisions "apply to a mediation communication made by a person that has not
78
received actual notice of the agreement before the communication is made."
Thus, the parties might think that discussions are not going to be privileged, and
thereby be surprised to learn that the mediator's communications will remain
privileged. A likely result of this provision will be to require the careful mediator
to explore with the parties prior to the outset of the mediation whether they have
reached any such pre-mediation opt-out agreement. Similarly, less sophisticated
parties may have limited understanding of the distinctions between confidentiality
and privilege, as well as the various tiers of privilege. In the absence of learned
representation, such parties might possess limited understanding of the impact of
an opt-out agreement as to part or all of a mediation's communications. Does the
burden then fall upon the mediator to educate a party or all the parties to the relative wisdom of an opt-out agreement? Does the statute effectively require the
careful mediator to advise parties that they can enter into an opt-out agreement as
to the UMA's
privileges at the outset of every mediation?
Answers to these questions are not clear from the text or comments.
Another bothersome aspect of the UMA's approach to confidentiality relates
to the drafters' decision to require in camera hearings by a subsequent tribunal for
only two of the proposal's many exceptions and waivers to the various privileges.
Section 6(b) sets forth exceptions to the act's privileges for mediation communications that are sought or offered in either (1) a later felony court proceeding, or
(2) a proceeding in which a contract defense has been asserted to an agreement
reached at mediation.79 If a party seeks discovery or wants to introduce mediation
communications for either purpose, the proponent must, in an in camera hearing,
demonstrate "that the evidence is not otherwise available" and "that there is a
need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality." 80 The drafters' formulation of a balancing process for these two exceptions is well-crafted; however, that the drafters opted to require this in camera
process prior to disclosure only for these two exceptions speaks volumes about the
lack of seriousness with which mediation confidentiality was viewed in general.
Why was the in camera process not made applicable across the spectrum of exceptions and waivers? For certain of the exceptions, such as Section 6(a)(1) relating
to signed mediation agreements or Section 6(a)(2) regarding open public records, 8' the use of an in camera hearing process would likely be unnecessary. Yet
on the other hand, one would suppose that if there were truly a commitment to
safeguarding the confidentiality of mediation communications, there would have
78. Id. § 3(c). The Official Comments suggest that the parties "should inform the mediators or
nonparty participants" of any such opt-out agreement to avoid this patchwork of non-privileged and
privileged communications, but the statute includes no direction or requirement to do so. Id. § 3, cmt.
7.
79. Id. §§ 6(b)(1)-(2). The drafters apparently could not agree on whether the exception should
relate to later misdemeanor proceedings given that the provision leaves that option up to adopting
states.
80. Id. § 6(b).
81. Id. § 6(a)(1)-(2).
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most of the rebeen a greater employment of the in camera hearing process for
82
maining exceptions and waivers to the assorted UMA privileges.
The UMA's vast array of exceptions, waivers, and preclusions to privilege, in
addition to the differing levels of privilege, will lead inexorably to numerous judicial challenges. Rather than the occasional fight to evade a broad confidentiality
statute such as we have experienced in Texas, parties in later legal proceedings in
states adopting the UMA will have numerous opportunities to persuade the courts
to open the door to mediation communications given the wide-open and labyrinthine structure of the proposal's approach to privilege. Prudent attorneys who
represent parties at mediation will either have to provide substantial caution to
their clients about the questionable prospects for later success in keeping mediation communications privileged in the event of non-settlement, or advise the client
of a strong need to engage in drafting and negotiating a true confidentiality
agreement with the opposing counsel prior to the outset of a mediation.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS
Although the main focus of this essay" is to address problems and concerns
with the UMA's approach to confidentiality and its unnecessary complexity as
contrasted with the Texas ADR Act, the UMA includes several other troubling
aspects. In this section of my essay I will address a few areas of concern that I
perceive, as well as several problem areas that other organizations have raised.
A. Ancillary Provisions
In addition to major concerns centering on the UMA's approach to confidentiality and its complexity, several other aspects of the UMA are problematic. For
example, the UMA has been drafted to apply only to mediation, not other forms of
nonbinding ADR procedures. In contrast, the Texas ADR Act is applicable to
nonbinding processes such as mini-trials, moderated settlement conferences,
summary jury trials, and nonbinding arbitrations. 83 The confidentiality provisions
apply to all such nonbinding processes. 84 Also, the UMA defines "mediation" as
"aprocess in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary settlement agreement." 85 The focus is
exclusively on the goal of reaching agreement. In contrast, the Texas ADR Act
more broadly defines "mediation" as being intended "to promote reconciliation,
settlement, or understanding" between parties.86 Although not as substantive a
distinction as some of the others that I have delineated, the Texas ADR Act does
recognize that mediation can be productive through the encouragement of understanding or reconciliation, even when the process does not result in a settlement.
82. Cf. Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, at § 154.073(e) (requiring in camera hearings in the event of
conflicts between the Texas ADR Act's confidentiality provisions and other legal requirements for
disclosure).
83. Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, §§ 154.024-027.
84. See id. §§ 154.053, 154.073 (making such provisions applicable to "alternative dispute resolution procedures").
85. UMA, supra n. 2, § 2(1).
86. Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, § 154.023(a).
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Another distinction between the UMA and the Texas ADR Act is that the
Texas statute includes provisions relating to the qualifications of impartial third
parties. 87 The statute requires generally that a person have completed "40 classroom hours of training in dispute resolution techniques" for most appointments as
a neutral, and "an additional 24 hours of training in the fields of family dynamics,
child development, and family law" for disputes relating to the parent-child
relationship.88 The UMA includes no such provisions. Instead, the UMA "does not
require that a mediator have a special qualification by background or profession." 89 The drafters left the question of qualifications up to the states, and were of
the view that although "[q]ualifications may be important, ... they need not be
uniform." 90 Thus, if the UMA were to be enacted, other provisions relating to the
qualifications of neutrals would need to be enacted, retained, or revisited.
Although the UMA's drafters declined to set forth any qualifications for mediators, the UMA does include a requirement that any person who has been requested to serve as a mediator make certain disclosures that have a bearing on the
impartiality of the prospective mediator. 91 The types of matters that the proposal
requires to be disclosed, such as financial or personal interest in the outcome, or
92
existing or past relationships with a party or a foreseeable participant, are largely
unobjectionable. Indeed, as the drafters have observed, they are "consistent with
the ethical obligations imposed on other ADR neutrals., 93 On the other hand,
these provisions are arguably misplaced in this statute. These forms of ethical94
disclosures seem far better suited for inclusion in codes of ethics for mediators.
In addition, there is a certain degree of inconsistency in the drafters' having included these ethical disclosure obligations, yet having left out any coverage of
mediator qualifications. Moreover, if there is a desire to codify certain ethical
provisions, why limit the codification only to the disclosure requirements? The
provisions are misplaced. 95
Another troubling aspect of the UMA relates to two of the proposal's approaches to criminal matters. Although Section 6(b)(1) does a good job of limiting
the potential use of mediation communications in later criminal proceedings
through an in camera balancing process, 96 Sections 5(c) and 6(a)(4) leave the door
open to significant potential mischief. 97 Section 5(c) bars a person who "intention87. Id. § 154.052.
88. Id. § 154.052(a)-(b). A Texas court can make an appointment of an impartial third party who
does not meet the ordinary training requirements in "appropriate circumstances" and based on "legal or
other professional training or experience." Id. § 154.052(c).
89. UMA, supra n. 2, § 9(f). The UMA also imposes no duty on a prospective mediator to disclose
that person's qualifications unless requested to do so by a mediation party. Id. § 9(c).
90. Id. § 9, cmt. 2.

91. Id. § 9(a).
92. Id. § 9(a)(1).
93. Id. § 9, cmt. 1(a).
94. Consider, for example, the State Bar of Texas ADR Section's Ethical Guidelines for Mediators,
which include comparable disclosure requirements as part of many other ethical principles. State Bar
of Texas ADR Section, Ethical Guidelines for Mediators <http://texasadr.org/ethicalguidelines.cfm>
(accessed March 1, 2003).
95. As will be discussed below, other organizations have been sharply critical of another aspect of §
9 - the forfeiture of privilege protections for a violation the disclosure requirements. See infra nn. 10921 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of § 9(d)).
96. UMA, supra n. 1, § 6(b)(1).
97. Id. §§ 5(c), 6(a)(4).
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ally uses a mediation to plan, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to conceal
98
an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity" from asserting a UMA privilege.
Similarly, Section 6(4) excepts from the privileges provisions any mediation
communication that is "intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit a
crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity." 99 At one
level, these appear unobjectionable. For example, suppose that one party at a mediation assaults the other party with physical blows. Most would likely agree that
this type of "communication" should not be privileged - even if it were viewed as
a "statement" covered by the UMA's definition of "mediation communication. '°
On the other hand, why are these exceptions even necessary given that Section
6(b)(1) is already designed to cover the introduction of mediation communications
in later criminal proceedings? Moreover, under Sections 5(c) and 6(a)(4), unlike
Section 6(b)(1), there is no in camera balancing process prior to the discovery or
introduction of the proffered communications. In addition, the very openendedness of the exceptions in Sections 5(c) and 6(a)(4) will serve as invitations
to aggressive and clever (or not-so clever) prosecutors to engage in fishing expeditions to try to obtain mediation records or communications through the grand jury
process or otherwise. Even the drafters have "recognize[d] that it is possible that
the exception itself could be abused."' (" On the other hand, Texas mediators are
very well aware of the prospect of an aggressive prosecution effort to obtain mediation files as was the situation in In re GrandJury Subpoena Dated December
17, 1996.102 In In re GrandJury Subpoena, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit refused to quash a subpoena issued to the Texas Agricultural
Mediation Program that required disclosure to a grand jury of numerous files relating to the program's mediations. 0 3 Although the program was federally funded,
the court disregarded approved contract language calling for application of the
Texas ADR Act's confidentiality provisions and refused to apply the confidentiality sections of the federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act.' Ironically, the
Texas ADR Act clearly reaches and makes confidential "communication[s] relatwhether before or after
ing to the subject matter of any civil or criminaldispute ...
the institution of formal judicial proceedings."'' 0 5 By way of contrast, the UMA

98. Id. § 5(c).
99. Id. § 6(a)(4).
100. Id. § 2(2).
101. Id. § 6, cmt. 5. The drafters opined further that "[s]uch unethical or bad faith conduct would
continue to be subject to traditional sanction standards." Id. This statement arguably overshoots the
mark. A zealous prosecutor might simply urge the court that an investigation into a prior mediation
was necessary to explore whether there were any attempts by a target defendant who was a mediation
participant "to conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity." Id. § 6(a)(4).
102. 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom.Moczygemba v. U.S., 526 U.S. 1040 (1999).
103. Id. at 489.
104. Id. at 491-93. For a discussion and criticism of In re GrandJury Subpoena, see Shannon, supra
n. 18, at 94-96.
105. Texas ADR Act, supra n. 1, § 154.073(a) (emphasis added). See also Williams v. State, 770
S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.) (rejecting the state's attempt to introduce prior mediation communications in a later prosecution); Shannon, supra n. 18, at 99-101 (discussing Williams and the application of this Texas provision to criminal matters).
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leaves the door open to potentially broad forays
into mediation communications in
06
later criminal investigations or proceedings.1

B. Objections by Others
Other organizations and individuals within the ADR community have voiced
additional objections to the UMA. In this subsection, I will highlight objections by
two such groups, the International Academy of Mediators (IAM) and the Pennsylvania Bar Association's Dispute Resolution Committee. 1°7 The IAM adopted a
resolution on October 31, 2001, opposing the adoption of the UMA.' ° The IAM
primarily opposed UMA Section 9's "linking" of the violation of that section's
ethical disclosure requirements with a "voiding [of] the evidentiary privilege in
underlying civil litigation between the parties."' 9 In this regard, the IAM expressed concern that a "mediator's failure to disclose ... should not have the effect
of vitiating the privilege protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications," and that under the proposal, "communications (offers of compromise;
hearsay; mediator to impeach witnesses, etc.) expected to be confidential now
become discoverable or admissible as evidence."" 0 In addition, the IAM also
opposed having exceptions to privilege in later criminal proceedings, and questioned whether the UMA's definition of "mediation communication is broad
enough to encompass conduct not intended as a 'statement' or involves the demeanor, reactions or other nonverbal actions of participants.""'
In response to the IAM position, leadership from the UMA drafting committees submitted an open memorandum to followers of the UMA's deliberations and
process."12 In particular, the memorandum emphasized that although the mediator
would lose privileges under Section 9(d), the parties and non-party participants
would not and could "still block testimony in such situations, a point ignored in
IAM's Resolution."" 3 The Official Comments retain this position and observe

106. Moreover, in light of In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the UMA would likely have no application to
any effort by a federal prosecutor to subpoena mediation records or to probe participants as to their
mediation communications.
107. I also direct the reader's attention to an extensive critique and careful analysis by Professor Scott
Hughes, in which he has contended that the UMA provides greater protections to mediators than to the
parties and more than may be needed or appropriate. Hughes, supra n. 40.
108. Res. of Intl. Acad. of Mediators OpposingAdoption of the UMA [hereinafter "IAM Resolution"]
<http://www.texasadr.org/umaresolutionopposed.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2003).
109. Id. at 1. Section 9(d) provides that if a prospective mediator does not make proper disclosures
about the covered conflicts of interest, that person "is precluded by the violation from asserting a
privilege under Section 4 [of the UMA]." JMA, supra n. 2, § 9(d).
110. 1AM Resolution, supra n. 108, at 1. The LAM also expressed concern that this aspect of the
UMA is "impractical in its application" and that it is unclear as to "[h]ow and by whom" violations of
the disclosure requirements are to be determined. Id.
11. Id. The resolution opined that "[s]cars, limping, blinking, blushing, coughing or other physical
attributes or reactions of participants are not within the definition" and presumably would not be privileged. Id.
112. Memo. from Michael B. Getty et al. to "Those Following the UMA," lAM Should Take Another
Look at UMA, Reconsider Opposition (Nov. 8, 2001) <http://www.texasadr.org/umaimaresp.pdf>
(accessed March 4, 2003).
113. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original omitted). The memorandum also addresses the LAM concern about
criminal cases by focusing on the in camera review process contained in § 6(b)(l), and assessing that
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that "in a situation in which the mediator has lost the privilege, for example, the
parties may still come forward and assert their privilege, thus blocking the mediator who has lost the privilege from providing testimony about the affected mediation."114
Subsequent to the memorandum by the leadership of the UMA drafting committees, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Dispute Resolution Committee issued
its report opposing adoption of the UMA.11 5 Although this report included numerous criticisms of the UMA, the report commented that "Section 9(d) is at the root
of the UMA problem. It creates the opportunity for tremendous mischief while
adding nothing substantively to the UMA nor to the promotion of mediation as an
1 16
annex to the court system or as a true alternative to litigation.", Similar to the
that "[t]he efasserted
Report
IAM position on the same issue, the Pennsylvania
procmediation
the
and
after
fect of this provision is to create uncertainty during
1
The
challenged."
subsequently
be
any,
may
if
ess about what communications,
violations
for
disclosure
privilege
of
preclusion
9(d)'s
Section
characterized
report
as creating a "chilling effect" on communications, and as "weakening" the "protection for a candid exchange of information."' 8 The report also suggested that it
"makes no practical sense to tie violation of an ethical rule" to the "voiding [of] an
evidentiary privilege" in later civil litigation. 19 In reaching its position, the Pennsylvania Report also responded to the UMA drafters' contention that even under
Section 9(d), a party can still block a person from testifying at a later proceeding.' 20 In this regard, the Pennsylvania Report declared the following:
If a party can preclude the mediator from testifying in an underlying action under [UMA] Section 4, even though the mediator has no privilege,
then Section 9(d) becomes effectively meaningless. If inability to assert
the privilege is intended only for actions where the mediator is a party,
then the UMA should expressly state that in Section 9(d) since ... the
UMA already has an express Section 6(a)(5) exception dealing with ac2
tions against professional mediators arising from the mediation.' '
The Pennsylvania Report appears to raise a valid concern. Given that disclosure requirements are generally included in codes of ethics for ADR professionals,
it does not appear necessary to codify the requirement - particularly if the codes
of ethics are viewed as satisfactorily protecting the integrity of the process. Moresection as striking "a middle ground, providing what is in effect a rebuttable presumption that mediation communications are confidential in criminal proceedings." Id. at 3.
114. UMA, supra n. 2, § 9, cmt. (3)(b).
115. Report Adopted by the Penn. Bar Assoc. Dispute Res. Comm. on the Uniform Mediation Act by
NCCULS [sic] [hereinafter "Pennsylvania Report"] (Nov. 29, 2001) <http://texasadr.org/umapareport.pdf> (accessed March 4, 2003).
116. Id. at 8. Among the many other criticisms included in the Pennsylvania Report, the report, like
the IAM position statement, raised concerns about whether the definition of "mediation communication is broad enough to encompass conduct not intended as a 'statement' or involves the demeanor,
reactions or other nonverbal actions of participants." Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
121. Id.
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over, the linkage of a violation of the ethical rule with a later partial bar on confidentiality protection is odd given that the other participants can still assert privilege. Given that the failure of adequate disclosures by the mediator would most
likely lead to a possible mediator malpractice action, the mediator malpractice
exception in Section 6(a)(5)1 22 should be adequate. Alternatively, in a scenario in
which the parties did not reach a settlement agreement at the mediation and it is
somehow learned that the mediator failed to make a full disclosure of a possible
conflict, the parties should not have an open door to a fishing expedition with the
mediator about communications from the mediation. And, given that either party
could still block such inquiries, what is the point of Section 9(d) as drafted? Of
course, in my view a better approach - at least for Texas - would be for the legislature to reject not just Section 9(d), but also the UMA as a whole, and possibly
consider an exception to our broad confidentiality statute for mediator malpractice
actions. 123
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the UMA's drafters have engaged in substantial efforts to create a workable statute to bring about greater uniformity in mediation
practice around the country. For the reasons described above, however, when
compared to an established and long-utilized statute such as the Texas ADR Act,
the UMA falls short. The UMA's backwards approach to confidentiality as well
as its maze of privileges, waivers, and exceptions are not an adequate substitute
for the current Texas approach. Other than the hope of greater uniformity, the
drafters and supporters have simply not made the case that Texas should shelve its
statute that is now enjoying its fifteenth year of successful application. Although
the Texas ADR Act is not perfect and could benefit from some legislative finetuning, its broad and comparatively simple approach to confidentiality with narrowly crafted exceptions has well-served disputants and the courts of this state,
and is far superior to the direction taken by the UMA. The UMA train has now
left the station, but there is no compelling reason for Texas to jump on board.

122. UMA, supra n. 2, § 6(a)(5).
123. See supra nn. 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the role of confidentiality in mediator
malpractice claims).
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